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Abstract:  Objectives. To reduce overprescribing, health campaigns urge physicians to provide people 
with information regarding appropriate antibiotic use and encourage the public to trust their physicians’ 
prescribing decisions. We test i) whether providing individuals with information about the viral aetiology 
of an illness and the ineffectiveness of antibiotics will reduce inappropriate antibiotic expectations, ii) 
whether individuals with greater trust in their physician will have lower expectations, and iii) whether 
individuals with greater trust in their physician will benefit more from the complete information provision 
and have lower expectations. Design. Experiment 1 features a between-subjects design (information 
provision: baseline vs. complete information) with a general measure of participants trust in their 
physician. Experiment 2 features a 2 (physician trustworthiness: low vs. high) × 2 (information provision: 
baseline vs. complete information) between-subjects design. Methods. In Experiment 1, participants (n = 
366) reported their trust in their physician, read a vignette describing a hypothetical consultation with a 
physician for a viral cold then expressed their expectations for antibiotics. In Experiment 2, participants 
(n = 380) read a vignette of a consultation with a physician for a viral ear infection then expressed their 
expectations for antibiotics. Results. In both experiments, the provision of complete information 
significantly reduced inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. Greater trust in physicians was associated 
with higher antibiotic expectations in Experiment1, but lower expectations in Experiment 2. In both 
experiments trust in physicians appeared to facilitate the effect of information provision, but this effect 
was weak and inconsistent. Conclusion. Providing information about viral aetiology and the 
ineffectiveness and side effects of antibiotics reduces inappropriate antibiotic expectations. Further 
research into the effect of trust in physicians as a moderator of the effect information provision is 
required, particularly given the recent increase in trust-based antibiotic campaigns.  
Keywords: Antibiotic expectations, antibiotic resistance, nonclinical factors, trust, physician-patient 
relationship 
  




Around 33,000 deaths a year in the European Union alone are attributed to antibiotic resistance 
infections (Cassini et al., 2019). Unabated, antibiotic resistance will continue to engender severe 
health and economic consequences worldwide (World Health Organization, 2014). 
Overprescribing of antibiotics promotes the spread and development of antibiotic resistance 
(Goossens, Ferech, Stichele, & Elseviers, 2005). A well documented source of antibiotic 
overprescribing is in primary care where, according to recent estimates, 20% of prescriptions (≈ 
6.3 million) are given out unnecessarily each year (Pouwels, Dolk, Smith, Robotham, & 
Smieszek, 2018; Public Health England, 2017). In response, there have been urgent calls to 
reduce antibiotic resistance by quelling overprescribing in primary care (Davies, 2018). One 
proposal has been to try and reduce the impact of inappropriate expectations for antibiotics – 
which refers to expectations for antibiotics in a situation where they are not clinically justified 
(e.g., for a viral infection) – by developing more effective methods for informing people about 
appropriate antibiotic use (Donald, 2016). To do so effectively, research must establish which 
factors might facilitate the effect of information provision at reducing inappropriate expectations 
for antibiotics.  
During a primary care consultation, the patient’s behaviour exerts a powerful influence 
on whether a physician will withhold or prescribe antibiotics (Macfarlane, Holmes, Macfarlane, 
& Britten, 1997). Patient expectations for antibiotics have been identified as a particularly 
important factor in the overprescribing of antibiotics in primary care (McNulty, Nichols, French, 
Joshi, & Butler, 2013; Pan et al., 2016; Sirota, Round, Samaranayaka, & Kostopoulou, 2017). 
Patients who expect antibiotics from a physician almost always receive them (McNulty et al., 
2013). Building on these findings, Sirota et al. (2017) provided causal evidence that patients’ 
RUNNING HEAD: TRUST AND ANTIBIOTIC EXPECTATIONS 
4 
 
expectations to receive antibiotics are sufficient to actuate physicians to prescribe them – even 
when they are not clinically justified (i.e., inappropriate). Clinical guidelines recommend that 
when antibiotics are not needed physicians should inform patients about the nature of the illness, 
the ineffectiveness and side effects of antibiotics, and alternative treatments for managing the 
illness (Tan, Little, & Stokes, 2008).  
Given that providing information to primary care patients has only a limited effect on 
overprescribing (Macfarlane et al., 2002; Mainous 3rd, Hueston, Love, Evans, & Finger, 2000; 
Meeker et al., 2016), we can assume that it is not a sufficient condition for completely 
eradicating patients’ inappropriate antibiotic expectations. Several reasons exist as to why the 
communicated information has only a limited effect, but one obvious reason might be that people 
do not trust the information enough. Indeed, evidence indicates that more trustworthy sources are 
more persuasive (Glaeser & Sunstein, 2013; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Tormala, Brinol, & Petty, 
2006). Thus, prompting patients to trust their physicians’ might lead to greater acceptance of the 
information provided by physicians (Ancillotti et al., 2018; André, Vernby, Berg, & Lundborg, 
2010; Brookes-Howell et al., 2014), which in turn would lead to a greater effect of information 
provision at reducing inappropriate antibiotic expectations from primary care patients.  
Patients’ trust in their physician has general importance in health communication and, in 
particular, in physician communications intended to guide patient treatment decisions (Hall, 
Camacho, Dugan, & Balkrishnan, 2002; Katz, 2002; Thom, 2000; Thom, Hall, & Pawlson, 2004; 
Thom, Kravitz, Bell, Krupat, & Azari, 2002). Overall, trusting patients are more likely to report 
being satisfied with the care provided by their physician and to openly communicate medical 
problems (Freburger, Callahan, Currey, & Anderson, 2003). Trusting patients are also more 
likely to report greater adherence to their physicians’ instructions (Freburger et al., 2003). For 
RUNNING HEAD: TRUST AND ANTIBIOTIC EXPECTATIONS 
5 
 
example, Safran et al. (1998) found that patient’s trust in the physician was strongly correlated 
with adherence to physicians’ recommendations regarding risky health behaviours (e.g., 
smoking, alcohol consumption). The role of trust has been recognized in public campaigns as 
well. For instance, in 2018, a national campaign by Public Health England contained a salient 
plea for members of the public to “Always take your doctor’s advice” on antibiotics.  
In addition to the apparent general importance of trust in health communications, the 
hypothesis that enhancing trust in physicians will bolster the benefits of information provision is 
supported by population level data and qualitative research. For example, in Sweden, a country 
with low antibiotic prescribing rates, public trust in physicians’ judgments of when to prescribe 
and withhold antibiotics is high; as is knowledge of antibiotic usage and resistance (André et al., 
2010). Faber, Heckenbach, Velasco, and Eckmanns (2010) noted that, in Germany, respondents 
who did not trust their physicians’ prescribing decisions not only admitted that they would not 
accept the decision, but would attempt to convince the physician to give them antibiotics anyway 
or go and visit another physician who would. Interviews with patients also report that trust 
appears to be a key factor in whether they accept their physicians’ antibiotic prescribing 
decisions (Ancillotti et al., 2018; Brookes-Howell et al., 2014).  
However, there is currently no causal evidence that patients who trust their physician 
would be more receptive to information from their physician about whether they need antibiotics 
and, in turn, less likely to expect them. While both population level data and primary care level 
interviews provide useful insights into the potential role of trust, these findings are ambiguous 
with regard to how to interpret the relationship between trust in physicians and the acceptance of 
information about antibiotics. Increased trust might facilitate the effect of information provision 
at reducing inappropriate expectations for antibiotics –– or might only increase/decrease as a 
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function of information provision. In which case, attempting to reduce inappropriate expectations 
by targeting trust would likely not be as successful as desired. 
 The effectiveness of initiatives aiming to tackle antibiotic resistance by reducing 
inappropriate expectations depends greatly on psychological research to identify key components 
of behaviour change (Donald, 2016; Tonkin-Crine, Walker, & Butler, 2015). Hence, there would 
be substantial practical benefits from establishing the nature, and magnitude, of the relationship 
between trust in physicians and the acceptance of information about antibiotics. Doing so would 
also provide theoretical insight into the information processing mechanisms underlying the 
formation, and maintenance, of inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. 
Present Research 
The overarching goal of the present research is to establish whether trust in physicians 
moderates the effectiveness of information provision at reducing inappropriate expectations for 
antibiotics. In Experiment 1, we aim to see whether natural variations of participant’s trust in 
their physician moderates the effect of information provision on patients’ expectations for 
antibiotics. We hypothesize that individuals who are informed about the viral aetiology of the 
illness and the ineffectiveness of antibiotics will be less likely to have inappropriate expectations 
for antibiotics than individuals who do not receive this information (Hypothesis 1). Second, we 
hypothesize that individuals with greater trust in their physician will have lower expectations for 
antibiotics (Hypothesis 2). Third, we hypothesize that participants’ trust in their physician will 
moderate the effect of information provision, whereby individuals with greater trust in their 
physician will benefit more from the information provision and, in turn, have lower expectations 
for antibiotics (Hypothesis 3).  
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In Experiment 2, we aim to provide causal evidence for the moderation role of trust on 
information provision reducing inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. To do so, we designed 
a manipulation, which taps into the two basic dimensions on which people evaluate the 
trustworthiness of others: warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Judd, James-
Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). In a medical context, these dimensions can be understood 
as the patient’s belief that the physician will act with the patient’s best interests in mind and that 
the physician has the necessary ability to do so (Mechanic & Schlesinger, 1996). We again test 
three hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that information from a physician will reduce 
inappropriate expectations for antibiotics (Hypothesis 4). Second, we hypothesize that 
descriptions of high physician trustworthiness will decrease expectations compared to 
descriptions of low physician trustworthiness (Hypothesis 5). Third, we also hypothesize that the 
effect of information provision will be more pronounced when the physician is perceived as 
being high in trustworthiness compared to being low in trustworthiness (Hypothesis 6). 
Both experiments will advance theoretical understanding of the factors underlying 
inappropriate antibiotic expectations. Experiment 1 will provide insight into how trust in 
physicians moderates the effect of information provision when trust is naturally distributed 
within the sample, while Experiment 2 will provide causal evidence for the effect of trust in 
physicians on the facilitative effect of information provision to patients. All non-pilot data were 
collected after the date of in-principle acceptance. The link to the approved Stage 1 protocol, raw 










Participants. In the absence of a meaningful effect size estimate in the published 
literature regarding the effect of information provision and trust in physicians as a moderator of 
inappropriate antibiotic expectations, we used a small effect size as the lowest meaningful effect 
size estimate for our power analysis (Cohen, 1988). Assuming α = .05 and 1-β = .90 for a 
conventionally small effect (f2 = .03), we conducted a-priori power analysis for a linear multiple 
regression analysis (fixed model, single regression coefficient, 3 predictors) to test the effect of 
information provision on expectations for antibiotics (testing Hypothesis 1), the effect of general 
trust in physicians on expectations for antibiotics (testing Hypothesis 2), and the interaction 
effect of trust in physicians and information provision (testing Hypothesis 3) (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007). This calculation resulted in a total sample size of 353 participants. We 
contacted participants from the general adult population via an online recruitment panel 
(Prolific). Participants were paid £0.93 upon completion of the study, which took 5 minutes on 
average. Only participants who had (i) achieved at least 90% approval rate in previous studies, 
(ii) resided in the United Kingdom, and (iii) were at least 18 years old were eligible to 
participate. We expected an exclusion rate of about 10%. To reach the target minimum size of 
353 participants, we aimed to gather data from 389 participants. If after applying the a-priori 
exclusion criteria the valid sample size had been < 353 the contingency plan was to collect more 
participants (in groups of 10) until the minimum valid sample size was ≥ 353. 
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A total of 393 participants accessed the experiment; one participant did not consent to 
participate and did not complete the experiment1. Aligned with the pre-specified exclusion 
criteria, we excluded two participants who did not complete the study fully and a further 24 
participants who did not respond to an attention check as instructed (see Attention check in the 
Supplementary Materials). The final sample consisted of 366 participants (102 were male, 262 
female, and 2 other; age ranged from 18 to 70 years old, M = 35.49, SD = 12.17 years). The 
majority of participants identified as white (89%). Most participants were in full time 
employment (64%) and the level of education varied between those with less than an 
undergraduate degree (36%), those with an undergraduate degree (44%), and those with a 
masters or doctoral degree (20%). Baseline characteristics for participants in each arm of 
experiments 1 and 2 are presented in Table 1. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert please Table 1 around here 
        --------------------------------------------------- 
 
Design. All participants reported their general trust in their physician. Participants were 
then randomly allocated to either the baseline condition (i.e., no explicit information about the 
viral nature of the respiratory infection or about antibiotics) or the complete information 
condition (i.e., explicit information about the viral nature of the respiratory infection and the 
function and potential side effects of antibiotics). We measured participant’s trust in their 
 
1 The reason an extra four participants accessed the experiment than was intended is because the Prolific recruitment 
system automatically replaces participants who have ‘timed-out’ or ‘returned’ their submission with new 
participants even if these participants do go on to submit their data. 
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physician prior to the manipulation of information provision to avoid the possibility that the 
manipulation might influence the participant’s reported trust in their physician. The dependent 
variable was the participant’s expectations for antibiotics. Random allocation to conditions 
(block randomization) was carried out using the built-in randomizer function in Qualtrics’ survey 
flow. 
Materials and procedure. After providing informed consent, participants expressed 
their general trust in their physician on the 11-item Trust in Physician Scale (e.g., “I trust my 
doctor’s judgments about my medical care”)(Anderson & Dedrick, 1990). The items in the Trust 
in Physician scale were generated to reflect three dimensions of trust: dependability of the 
physician, confidence in the physician, and physician-patient confidentiality and the instrument 
demonstrated excellent internal consistency as well as construct validity (Anderson & Dedrick, 
1990). Participants were instructed, “Throughout this task, we would like you to think about your 
GP (the GP who you see the most often). If you do not see the same GP regularly, think about 
the GP who you saw most recently" and then asked to rate the extent to which they agree or 
disagree to the trust in physician items on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = 
Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Uncertain, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree). In this 
experiment, the trust in physician scale demonstrated excellent internal consistency (α = 0.88) 
and we computed a scale average for analysis. The trust in physician scale was then normalised 
by transforming the arithmetic mean for the 11 items to a value on a 0-100 scale where higher 
scores correspond to greater trust (Freburger et al., 2003).  
Following this, participants read a hypothetical medical scenario describing a 
consultation with a physician for symptoms of a common cold (see the Exp.1 vignette in the 
Supplementary Materials). The scenario was modelled in alignment with those published by 
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Sirota et al. (2017) and with the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidelines of a 
situation for which antibiotics are not clinically justified (Tan et al., 2008). In the scenario, all 
participants received a description of the symptoms, a description of the physical examination, 
and a diagnosis of a respiratory tract infection. In addition to this information, participants in the 
complete information condition also received an explanation from the physician that the 
infection is viral: “After the examination your GP explains that they think a viral respiratory tract 
infection is the cause of your symptoms.” and a description of the function of antibiotics and 
their side effects: “Your GP mentions that antibiotics are only effective for bacterial infections, 
have no positive effect on viral infections, provide no symptom relief and may have side effects 
such as diarrhoea, vomiting and rash.” Participants then reported their expectations for 
antibiotics as a treatment on a four-item scale and, for each item, provide their level of agreement 
on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 6 (1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Mildly 
disagree, 4 = Mildly agree, 5 = Agree, 6 = Strongly agree). The dependent variable displayed 
excellent internal consistency in both the baseline (α = 0.94) and information provision (α = 
0.93) conditions and so were both averaged for analysis. 
 Lastly, participants were asked whether they have ever visited their GP for a respiratory 
tract infection, if they have ever received antibiotics for a respiratory tract infection and to 
provide some general demographic information (age, gender, ethnicity, and employment). 
Statistical analyses. For the analysis, trust in physician scores were mean-centered and 
information provision was dummy coded (baseline condition = 0, complete information 
condition = 1). To test the effect of information provision (Hypothesis 1), the effect of trust in 
their physician (Hypothesis 2), and whether trust in their physician moderates the effect of 
information provision (Hypothesis 3) on expectations for antibiotics we ran a multiple linear 
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regression model on expectations for antibiotics as a treatment, with the information provision, 
trust in physicians, and their interaction term as predictors. OLS estimates were used to calculate 
standard errors. 
To control for the influence of past consultation behaviour and antibiotic usage, we re-ran 
this analysis with past consultation behaviour for respiratory tract infections and past experience 
of receiving antibiotics for respiratory tract infections added as covariates. All analyses were 
carried out using R. 
Results 
Aligned with our first hypothesis, participants who received information about the viral 
nature of the infection and the lack of efficacy and side effects associated with antibiotics had 
lower expectations of antibiotics for a respiratory infection (M = 3.3, SD = 1.4) than those who 
did not receive this information (M = 1.9, SD = 1.1), b = -1.42, t(362) = -10.76, p < .001. 
However, contrary to our second hypothesis, across all participants, greater trust in physicians 
was associated with higher, not lower, expectations for antibiotics, b = 0.01, t(362) = 2.79, p = 
.006. We conducted post-hoc analysis to include the average marginal effect of trust in the 
interaction model. The main effect of information provision was unaffected, b = -1.42, 95% CI[-
1.68, -1.16] , p < .001, but the main effect of trust was found to be non-significant, b = 0.003, 
95% CI[-0.004, 0.012] , p = .374. While this analysis was not planned it suggests confidence in 
the original finding that greater trust in physicians is associated with higher expectations for 
antibiotics is not decisive. As predicted, there was a significant effect of the interaction between 
information provision and trust in physicians predicting expectations for antibiotics, b = -0.02, 
t(362) = -2.72, p = .007 (see Figure 1) but not directly as expected (Hypothesis 3). In the baseline 
condition, participants with greater trust in physicians had significantly higher expectations for 
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antibiotics, which was not predicted, b = 0.01, t(362) = 2.79, p = .006. In the complete 
information condition participants with greater trust in physicians had lower expectations for 
antibiotics, which was predicted but the pattern was not statistically significant, b = -0.01, t(362) 
= -1.19, p = .235. The overall regression model with information provision, trust in physicians, 
and their interaction term as predictors of expectations for antibiotics was significant, F(3,362) = 
41.42, p < .001, R2 = .26. 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert please Figure 1 around here 
        --------------------------------------------------- 
Reported past consultation behaviour and antibiotic prescribing history for respiratory 
tract infections were then entered as covariates in two subsequent multiple regression models. In 
the model accounting for past consultation behaviour for respiratory tract infections, the effect of 
information provision, b = -1.39, t(361) = -11.06, p < .001 and the interaction between 
information provision and trust in physicians, b = -0.02, t(361) = -2.46, p = .014, remained 
significant predictors of expectations for antibiotics, but the effect of trust in physicians did not, 
b = 0.01, t(361) = 1.93, p = .054. In the model accounting for past receipt of antibiotic 
prescriptions for respiratory tract infections there were significant main effects of information 
provision, b = -1.27, t(361) = -10.09, p < .001, trust in physicians, b = 0.01, t(361) = 2.41, p = 
.017 and the interaction between information provision and trust in physicians b = -0.02, t(361) = 
-2.77, p = .006. Thus, with the exception of the effect of trust in physicians being reduced to 
nonsignificance when controlling for past consultation behaviour, the results did not differ 
substantially from the original regression model.  
Experiment 2  
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Results from Experiment 1 showed that natural variations of participant’s trust in their physician 
moderates the effect of information provision on patients’ expectations for antibiotics. To 
provide causal evidence of the role of trust, in Experiment 2 we manipulated the perceived 
trustworthiness of the physician alongside information provision and assess the effect on 
inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. The manipulation of trustworthiness was designed 
using cues of warmth and competence, which were based on prior research (Fiske et al., 2007; 
Howe, Goyer, & Crum, 2017) and validated in two pre-tests (see Supplementary Materials). 
In this experiment, we hypothesized that participants who receive information from a 
physician about the viral illness aetiology and lack of antibiotic efficacy will be less likely to 
expect antibiotics (Hypothesis 4). We also hypothesized that participants in the high 
trustworthiness condition will also be less likely to expect antibiotics (Hypothesis 5) and that the 
effect of information provision will be more pronounced in the high trustworthiness condition 
compared to the low trustworthiness condition (Hypothesis 6). 
 
Method 
Participants. Prior research manipulating physicians’ warmth and competence in a 
factorial experimental design assumed a medium effect size (f = 0.25 ≈ η2p = .06) and 1-β ≈ .88 
(Howe et al., 2017). We opted for a smaller effect size than found in the prior literature (f = .17 ≈ 
f2 = .03) for our 2 × 2 design to account for effect size inflation due to publication bias and in 
alignment with the small effect assumed in Experiment 1. The resulting power analysis with α = 
.05, 1-β = .90, revealed a minimum sample size of 366 participants (Faul et al., 2007). We 
contacted participants from the general adult population via an online recruitment panel 
(Prolific). We applied the same inclusion criteria as in Experiment 1, with the additional 
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specification that participants who completed the first experiment were not eligible for this 
experiment. Participants were paid £0.59 a rate of £5.06 per hour upon completion of the study, 
which took 4 minutes on average. We aimed to collect 403 participants (≈ 100 per cell) to 
account for an expected 10% attrition rate to the a-priori exclusion criteria (same as for 
Experiment 1). If after applying the a-priori exclusion criteria the valid sample size had been < 
366 the contingency plan was to collect more participants (in groups of 10) until the minimum 
valid sample size was ≥ 366. 
A total of 413 participants accessed the experiment and all consented to participate in the 
experiment2. Aligned with the a-priori exclusion criteria, we excluded six participants who did 
not complete the study fully and 27 who did not respond to an attention check question as 
instructed. The final sample consisted of 380 participants (112 were male, 267 female, and 1 
other; age ranged from 18 – 75 years old, M = 35.85, SD = 13.05 years). The majority of 
participants identified as white (87%). Most participants were in full time employment (63%) 
and level of education varied between those with less than an undergraduate degree (35%), those 
with an undergraduate degree (47%), and those with a masters or doctoral degree (17%). 
Design. We tested our hypotheses in a 2 (physician trustworthiness: low vs. high) × 2 
(information provision: baseline vs. complete information) between-subjects design. The 
information provision factor was the same as in Experiment 1, with a baseline (i.e., no explicit 
information about the viral nature of the respiratory infection or about antibiotics) and complete 
information condition (i.e., explicit information about the viral nature of the respiratory infection 
and the function and potential side effects of antibiotics). For the physician trustworthiness 
 
2 As in Experiment 1, the reason a few more participants accessed the experiment than was intended is because the 
Prolific recruitment system automatically replaces participants who have ‘timed-out’ or ‘returned’ their submission 
with new participants even if these participants do go on to submit their data. 
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factor, participants were randomly assigned to either the low trustworthiness (i.e., descriptions of 
a cold and less competent physician behaviours) or high trustworthiness condition (i.e., 
descriptions of a warm and competent physician). The dependent variable was expectations for 
antibiotics as defined in Experiment 1. The random allocation to conditions (block 
randomization) was carried out using the built-in randomizer function in Qualtrics’ survey flow. 
Materials and procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were 
randomly assigned to read one of four hypothetical scenarios describing a visit to see a physician 
due to symptoms of acute otitis media (see the Exp.2 vignette in the Supplementary Materials). 
The scenario was modelled in alignment with those published by Sirota et al. (2017) and with the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidelines of a situation for which antibiotics 
are not clinically justified (Tan et al., 2008). The hypothetical scenario was similar to that in 
Experiment 1 (cold scenario), but in the context of a different viral infection (acute otitis media). 
As in Experiment 1, all participants received a description of the symptoms, a description of the 
physical examination, and a diagnosis (ear infection), but only participants in the complete 
information condition, received a description of the viral nature of the infection, the function of 
antibiotics and their side effects. 
In line with the universal dimensions of social cognition account of trust (Fiske et al., 
2007) low and high physician trustworthiness were manipulated via descriptions of the warmth 
and competence of the physician within the scenarios (see Table 2). 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert please Table 2 around here 
        --------------------------------------------------- 
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The effect of these manipulations of trust was validated in two pre-tests conducted before 
the first stage manuscript submission (full results are available in the Supplementary Materials). 
Cues of warmth and competence were combined as trustworthiness for three reasons. First, in 
pre-test 1 we found that our manipulations of warmth and competence were effective, but not 
localised. We found that manipulations of high warmth induced greater perceptions of both 
warmth and competence. The same was true for manipulations of competence affecting 
perceptions of both warmth and competence. Second, in pre-test 2, we found that combining 
manipulations of warmth and competence was effective in creating perceptions of low 
trustworthiness (M = 3.46, SD = 1.23) and high trustworthiness (M = 5.33, SD = 0.83); t(148) = 
15.041, p < .001, dz = 1.23. Third, in a recent clinical study, Howe et al. (2017) demonstrated 
that patients with positive expectations of treatments for an allergic reaction to histamine 
reported greater symptom relief from a placebo, but only when they perceived the attending 
physician to be high in both warmth and competence. 
After reading the scenario describing a consultation with a physician for an ear infection, 
participants indicated their expectations for antibiotics in this scenario using the same items as in 
Experiment 1. These items displayed excellent internal consistency in each of the four 
experimental conditions (α ranging from 0.91 to 0.95). Lastly, participants reported if they had 
ever visited their GP for an ear infection, if they had ever received antibiotics for an ear 
infection, and some general demographic information (age, gender, ethnicity, and employment). 
Statistical analyses. We ran a two-way factorial ANOVA to test for the main effect of 
complete information provision on inappropriate expectations for antibiotics (Hypothesis 4), the 
main effect of trustworthiness (Hypothesis 5), and the interaction between complete information 
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provision and trustworthiness on inappropriate expectations for antibiotics (Hypothesis 6). OLS 
estimates were used to calculate standard errors.  
We then re-ran this analysis as ANCOVA to control for the influence of past consultation 
behaviour and antibiotic usage. We ran one ANCOVA with past consultation for ear infections 
entered as a covariate and another with past experience of receiving antibiotics for ear infections 
entered as a covariate. All analyses were carried out in R.  
Results 
As shown in Figure 2, participants who received complete information provision about 
the viral nature of the infection and the ineffectiveness and harms of taking antibiotics for such 
an infection had lower expectations for antibiotics, than those who did not receive such 
information, F(1,376) = 185.75, p < .001, 
  = .33. Furthermore, participants who read 
descriptions of a warm and competent physician had lower expectations for antibiotics, than 
those who read descriptions of a cold and less competent physician, F(1,376) = 6.15, p = .014, 

  = .02. However, contrary to our expectation, the effect of the information provision was not 
bolstered when it was given by the trustworthy physicians compared to when it was given by the 
untrustworthy one as there was no significant interaction between the information provision and 
physician trustworthiness, F(1,376) = 0.05, p = .828, 
   < .01.  
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert please Figure 2 around here 
        --------------------------------------------------- 
Reported past consultation behaviour and antibiotic prescribing history for ear infections 
were then entered as covariates in two subsequent two-way factorial ANCOVAs. The results of 
these analyses did not differ substantially from the original ANOVA. Even when controlling for 
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past consultation behaviour for ear infections, providing information F(1,375) = 204.21, p < 
.001, 
   = .35, and encountering a more trustworthy physician, F(1,375) = 11.87, p = .001, 
   
= .03 both reduced participant’s expectations for antibiotics, and there was still no interaction (F 
< 1, p = .713). Similarly, when controlling for past receipt of antibiotic prescriptions for ear 
infections there were significant main effects of information provision, F(1,375) = 177.29, p < 
.001,  
   = .32, and physician trustworthiness, F(1,375) = 9.96, p = .002, 
   = .03 in reducing 
participant’s expectations of antibiotics as a treatment and no interaction (F < 1, p = .993). 
General Discussion  
A number of studies have shown that providing information to primary care patients in 
clinical settings only has a limited effect on overprescribing by physicians (John Macfarlane et 
al., 2002; Mainous 3rd et al., 2000; Meeker et al., 2016). Based on these findings we assumed 
that providing complete information would not completely eliminate inappropriate expectations 
for antibiotics and considered trust in physicians as a possible moderator of the effect. In both 
experiments we found that information provision reduced inappropriate expectations for 
antibiotics. Participants who received information about the viral nature of the illness and the 
lack of efficacy and side effects of antibiotics from the physician in the vignette had substantially 
lower expectations for antibiotics than those who did not receive this information. Current 
clinical recommendations encourage primary care physicians to inform patients about the cause 
of their illness and whether antibiotics will be effective or harmful (Tan et al., 2008). Our 
findings support these clinical recommendations and demonstrate with reliability across 
experiments how information provision can be used as a tool by physicians to reduce 
inappropriate expectations for antibiotics (Branthwaite & Pechère, 1996; Eng et al., 2003).  
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We chose to focus on whether trust in physicians could explain why not all people are 
convinced by clinical information provision for two reasons in particular. First, prior research 
suggests that the level of trust people have in someone can explain why some people are more 
persuasive than others (Glaeser & Sunstein, 2013; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Tormala et al., 2006) and, 
more importantly, why some patients are more likely to report adhering to their physicians’ 
instructions than others (Freburger et al., 2003; Safran et al., 1998). Second, population level 
surveys and qualitative interviews have proffered that public trust in physicians plays a key role 
in whether they will accept their physician’s antibiotic prescribing decision (Ancillotti et al., 
2018; André et al., 2010; Brookes-Howell et al., 2014; Faber et al., 2010).  
We found mixed evidence on the role of trust across the two experiments. In Experiment 
1, participants with greater reported trust in their physician actually had significantly higher 
expectations for antibiotics than those with less trust in their physician overall. However, in 
Experiment 2, where we manipulated whether the physician was trustworthy or untrustworthy 
based on competence and warmth, participants had lower expectations of antibiotics when 
consulting with the more trustworthy physician. Thus, while the finding of Experiment 2 is well 
aligned with the hypothesis that people with high trust in their physician would have lower 
expectations for antibiotics, the finding of Experiment 1 is clearly not. 
Inspection of the significant interaction between information provision and reported trust 
in physicians can shed further light on the unexpected finding from Experiment 1. In the 
complete information condition, we expected participants with greater trust in their physician to 
have lower expectations for antibiotics, which was aligned with the observed trend in our data, 
but this relationship was not statistically significant. This may have been due to a floor effect 
given that the expectations for antibiotics in the complete condition were quite low overall, 
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which could be masking that trust fuelled the effect of information on inappropriate expectations 
for antibiotics. However, post-hoc analysis using tobit regression to account for floor effects did 
not reveal any notable differences in the pattern of results (the full results of this unplanned 
analysis are available in the Supplementary Materials). More surprisingly, when no specific 
information about the illness or about antibiotics was provided, participants with greater trust in 
their physician were significantly more likely to inappropriately expect antibiotics. Although we 
predicted the opposite effect, one explanation for this finding could be that the participants who 
reported trusting their physician more might also be more comfortable expressing that they 
expect antibiotics (Thom et al., 2002). In Experiment 2, we found no interaction between 
information provision and trustworthiness, which indicates that the effect of receiving 
information did not depend on the trustworthiness of the physician. Prima facie, it appears that 
the perceived trustworthiness of the physician simply does not moderate the effect of information 
provision at reducing inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. However, alternative 
explanations might also account for this statistically non-significant finding. For instance, this 
finding may have also been due to a floor effect in the complete information condition, but post-
hoc analysis using tobit regression again did not reveal any notable differences to support this 
explanation (the full results of this unplanned analysis are available in the Supplementary 
Materials). It is also possible that the lack of significant effect here is because the information 
provided might have been considered trustworthy. As the information is congruent with many 
public campaigns it may itself signal high competence and trustworthiness in the physician and 
may have nullified the effect of the untrustworthy manipulations.   
Another reason we thought might account for the discrepancies between the results on the 
role of trust between experiments 1 and 2 could be the way trust was measured in Experiment 1 
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differed to the manipulations of physician trustworthiness in Experiment 2. It is possible that the 
general measure used in Experiment 1 measured trust in physicians at a trait-level, while the 
manipulations in Experiment 2 measured perceived trust in physicians, which is more context 
dependent. An individuals’ trait-level trust in their physician and state-level perception of trust in 
the physician might have distinct influences on the effect of information provision at reducing 
inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. Unfortunately, as the general measure of trust used in 
Experiment 1 was not present in Experiment 2, it was not possible to further explore this 
possibility. However, it was possible to check if some of the individual items present in the 
general trust scale differed in some subtle way to the manipulations used in Experiment 2. 
 The items from the Trust in Physician Scale were developed to cover three dimensions 
of trust: dependability (that they have the patients’ best interests in mind), confidence in the 
physician’s knowledge and skills, and physician-patient confidentiality (Anderson & Dedrick, 
1990). These dimensions map well onto the cues of warmth (dependability and confidentiality) 
and competence (the confidence in their knowledge and skill), which were manipulated in 
Experiment 2. But it could be that because of the more general nature of the questions asked in 
the scale, some items may have tapped into other more nuanced beliefs about their physician that 
were not present in the manipulations in Experiment 2 and driven the present findings. In light of 
this possibility, we conducted post-hoc regression analyses using the individual items from the 
Trust in Physician Scale as moderators of the effect of information on expectations. However, 
these post-hoc analyses revealed no notable differences in the directions of the main effect of 
trust in physicians or the interaction between trust in physicians and information provision and 
are thus unlikely to account for the observed pattern of results (full results are available in the 
Supplemental Materials).  
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We also acknowledge that demographic factors may have influenced the observed results. 
A limitation of the current research is that the participant samples in both experiments 1 and 2 
were not sufficiently heterogenous to draw any reliable inferences from an exploratory analysis 
of the measured demographic variables. Future research on the role of trust in physicians and 
information provision which is able to sample a more heterogenous participant pool would prove 
valuable. The data collection and statistical analyses plans for the present research were pre-
registered and any deviations have been documented. Both experiments were well powered to 
detect small effects and thus it is unlikely that power is an issue regarding the interpretation of 
the present findings. However, the power analysis could have better matched the conducted 
statistical tests by assuming tests of two main-effects and an interaction term where some 
variables are binary, rather than assuming tests of three main-effects relating to continuous 
variables. Another point worth noting is that while the inclusion of past consultation behaviour 
and antibiotic usage as covariates in Experiment 1 were important in controlling for potential 
confounding, in Experiment 2 (where trustworthiness was randomised) the inclusion of these 
covariates was not strictly necessary. 
 This is, to our knowledge, the only study to have used an experimental design to 
examine the role of trust in physicians alongside information provision on inappropriate 
expectations and requests for antibiotics in primary care. One limitation of the current vignette 
approach is that there is a clear lack of ecological validity as responses are based on imagined, 
not experienced, symptoms and interactions with a physician. However, the use of an 
experimental vignette-based design allowed for isolating the effects of trust and information 
provision on inappropriate expectations as well as controlling other key factors such as the 
illness duration, illness severity, and the behaviour of the physician. One alternative approach is 
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to employ immersive virtual reality technology. Such an approach has been used with physicians 
to simulate interactions with patients who have unreasonable demands for antibiotics (Pan et al., 
2016). Using this technique, the authors found that trainee physicians were more susceptible to 
patient pressure for antibiotics than their more experienced counterparts and that overall the 
physicians who took part reported the virtual situations to be convincing and realistic. These 
findings suggest that despite technical and logistic difficulties in implementation, this approach 
might be leveraged in future pre-clinical studies to enhance the ecological validity of future 
research on how patient-physician interactions influence inappropriate expectations for 
antibiotics.  
Despite the absence of causal evidence that increasing trust reduces inappropriate 
expectations for antibiotics, there have been widespread appeals that increasing and maintaining 
trust in physicians ought to be a priority for antibiotic health campaigns (André et al., 2010). In 
2018, Public Health England released a national campaign imploring the UK public to trust their 
doctor’s advice about when they need antibiotics. Though the impact of this campaign is yet to 
be established the present findings suggest that before embarking on further trust-based 
campaigns more research is needed to understand exactly how trust in physicians influences 
inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. 
Conclusion 
Clinical information provision from a physician can reduce but not completely eliminate 
inappropriate expectations for antibiotics. Whether the limited effect of information provision is 
due to a lack of trust in the physician remains inconclusive. More extensive research into this 
area is required, particularly given the recent increase in trust-based antibiotic campaigns. 
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   Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
   Baseline 
information  
(n = 181) 
Complete 
information  
(n = 185) 
 Low trust x 
Baseline 
information  
(n = 96) 
High trust x 
Baseline 
information  
(n = 93) 
Low trust x 
Complete 
information  
(n = 93) 
High trust x 
Complete 
information  
(n = 98) 
Mean age in years (SD)  34.39 (11.74) 36.48 (12.52)  35.00 (12.83) 35.86 (13.21) 37.06 (13.27) 35.53 (13.01) 
Gender           
 Male  45 (25%) 57 (31%)  25 (26%) 21 (23%) 29 (31%) 37 (38%) 
 Female   136 (75%) 126 (68%)  70 (73%) 72 (77%) 64 (69%) 61 (62%) 
 Other   0 (0%) 2 (1%)  1 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Education          
 Less than 
undergraduate  
 
64 (35%) 66 (36%)  35 (36%) 35 (38%) 28 (30%) 36 (37%) 
 Undergraduate   80 (44%) 82 (44%)  45 (47%) 41 (44%) 47 (51%) 47 (48%) 
 Masters or doctorate   37 (20%) 37 (20%)  16 (17%) 17 (18%) 18 (19%) 15 (15%) 
Ethnicity          
 White  156 (86%) 169 (91%)  87 (91%) 79 (85%) 79 (85%) 87 (89%) 
 Mixed/Multiple  6 (3%) 1 (1%)  2 (2%) 7 (8%) 6 (6%) 4 (4%) 
 Asian  9 (5%) 7 (4%)  5 (5%) 4 (4%) 5 (5%) 3 (3%) 
 Black  5 (3%) 5 (3%)  1 (1%) 2 (2%) 1 (1%) 3 (3%) 
 Other  5 (3%) 3 (2%)  1 (1%) 1 (1%) 2 (2%) 1 (1%) 
Employment          
 Employed  115 (64%) 119 (64%)  62 (65%) 57 (61%) 52 (56%) 67 (68%) 
 Unemployed  27 (15%) 33 (18%)  14 (15%) 20 (22%) 27 (29%) 12 (12%) 
 Retired  8 (4%) 10 (5%)  4 (4%) 6 (6%) 4 (4%) 5 (5%) 
 Student  31 (17%) 23 (12%)  16 (17%) 10 (11%) 10 (11%) 14 (14%) 
 
Table 1. Baseline participant characteristics in each arm (Experiments 1 and 2). 








Physician Trustworthiness: Low  Physician Trustworthiness: High 
   
Low Warmth  High Warmth  
       
As you enter the GP 
does not look up 
from the computer 
on the desk to look 
at you 
 The GP sits behind 
the computer and 
does not make any 
attempt at eye 
contact throughout 
the consultation  
 As you enter the 
GP looks up to 
welcome you with 
a warm smile 
 The GP moves 
away from the 
computer and 
turns towards 
you in order to 




       
Low Competence    High Competence   
       
The GP did not seem 
prepared for the 
consultation and a 




the GP looked for 
the right files and 
leaflets 
 It took two attempts 
to measure your 
respiratory rate as 
the GP made a 
mistake the first time 
 The GP was well 
prepared for the 
consultation. All 
necessary files 
were already open 
on the computer 
and relevant 
leaflets had been 
set out beforehand 
 The GP carried 







Table 2. Cues of Warmth and Competence in both the low and high trustworthiness conditions. 
  



















Figure 1. Effect of information provision (baseline in blue circles vs. complete information in 
red triangles) on expectations for antibiotics as a treatment is moderated by trust in physicians 
from Experiment 1 (n = 366).  
Note. Baseline condition: no explicit information about the viral nature of the infection or about 
antibiotics) and complete information condition: explicit information about the viral nature of the 
infection and antibiotics. Shaded portions around the slopes represent 95% confidence intervals. 







Figure 2. Effect of information provision (baseline vs. complete information) and physician 
trustworthiness (low vs. high) on expectations of antibiotics as a treatment from Experiment 2 (n 
= 380). 
 
 
